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Abstract
Neuraminidase inhibitors (NI) play a major role in plans to mitigate future influenza pandemics.
Modeling studies suggested that a pandemic may be contained at the source by early treatment and
prophylaxis with antiviral drugs. Here, we examine the influence of NI resistant influenza strains on
an influenza pandemic. We extend the freely available deterministic simulation program InfluSim to
incorporate importations of resistant infections and the emergence of de novo resistance. The
epidemic with the fully drug sensitive strain leads to a cumulative number of 19,500 outpatients and
258 hospitalizations, respectively, per 100,000 inhabitants. Development of de novo resistance alone
increases the total number of outpatients by about 6% and hospitalizations by about 21%. If a
resistant infection is introduced into the population after three weeks, the outcome dramatically
deteriorates. Wide-spread use of NI treatment makes it highly likely that the resistant strain will
spread if its fitness is high. This situation is further aggravated if a resistant virus is imported into a
country in the early phase of an outbreak. As NI-resistant influenza infections with high fitness and
pathogenicity have just been observed, the emergence of drug resistance in treated populations and
the transmission of drug resistant strains is an important public health concern for seasonal and
pandemic influenza.
Findings
Neuraminidase inhibitors (NI) play an important role in
plans to mitigate future influenza pandemics [1]. Mode-
ling studies suggested that a pandemic may be contained
at the source, if treatment and prophylaxis are applied in
an early phase of the epidemic. Large amounts of NI
(mainly oseltamivir) have been stockpiled in many coun-
tries to prepare for pandemic influenza, and many
national preparedness plans rely on this. However,
recently doubts have been raised whether this strategy is
realistic. Timeliness of the intervention due to difficulties
in early recognition and logistic challenges are some of the
points considered. The development of NI resistance is of
further concern.
Influenza viruses undergo continuous genetic changes by
means of mutation and recombination, promoting the
emergence of drug resistant strains. Viral resistance may
develop by modifications in the amino acid composition
of the neuraminidase or in the affinity of haemagglutinin
to the receptors of the cell surface [reviewed in [2]]. Prior
to the 2007/8 influenza season, NI resistant strains were
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found in patients after treatment with oseltamivir and in
patients not exposed to oseltamivir. Resistance to NI
occurred at a low level: less then 1% of immuno-compe-
tent patients were found to be infected with resistant virus
[3]. The emergence of a resistant strain may not necessar-
ily be dangerous, as the "fitness" of the resistant strain
determines its transmissibility [4,5]. Most resistant strains
lacked "fitness" and were unlikely to spread, but early sur-
veillance data from the 2007/8 influenza season on the
northern hemisphere suggest that an oseltamivir resistant
influenza virus type A(H1N1) circulates in several Euro-
pean countries and in the US [6,7]. The proportion of
resistant infections ranges between 4% and 67% (mean
20%, approximately 1.700 tested isolates) and have been
reported from 15 of 25 European countries under surveil-
lance [8].
To obtain a better understanding of the consequences
associated with the widespread use of NI as first-line
option against a novel pandemic influenza strain, we
extend the freely available simulation program InfluSim
to simulate the emergence and spread of NI resistant
strains [9,10]. We examine how the numbers of outpa-
tients and hospitalizations change if resistance emerges de
novo and is imported into a population in the early phase
of an outbreak. We compare scenarios with and without
the presence of drug resistance, using a basic reproduction
number R0 of 2.5 [11]. R0 is the expected number of sec-
ondary infections per case in a completely susceptible
population without interventions (it is calculated as the
maximum eigenvalue of the next generation matrix)
[12,13]. The fitness of the resistant infection, i.e. its capa-
bility to spread from person to person, is assumed to be
the same as that of the drug sensitive one. Concordant to
historical data and most pandemic plans [see [13,14]], we
assume that one third of all infected individuals remain
asymptomatic, one third becomes moderately sick and
one third becomes severely sick and seeks medical help.
All cases who seek medical help ('outpatients') are offered
antiviral treatment, and we assume that the NI stockpile is
sufficiently large. General (unspecified) social distancing
measures [15,16] are simulated by reducing the number
of contacts within the population by 10%. Isolation addi-
tionally reduces the number of contacts of moderately
sick cases by 10%, of severe cases who stay at home by
20%, and of hospitalized cases by 30%. On day zero, a
single infection (which is either drug sensitive or drug
resistant) is introduced into a fully susceptible popula-
tion. On day 21, a second introduction follows (again
drug sensitive or resistant). Drug resistance is assumed to
develop additionally de novo during the course of the pan-
demic wave (we assume that 4.1% of children and teenag-
ers and 0.32% of adults [cf. [17-19]] infected with the
drug sensitive virus develop a resistant infection when tak-
ing antiviral drugs. Cases infected with the resistant virus
do no longer respond to antiviral treatment. We report the
incidence and total number of outpatients and hospitali-
zations during the course of the pandemic wave in a Swiss
population of 100,000 inhabitants. The emergence and
the initial spread of drug resistance are highly stochastic.
Deterministic simulations as those presented here give
average or mean courses of the resulting dynamics, but do
not show the full stochastic range of results.
Without drug resistance, the simulated influenza epi-
demic causes 19,500 outpatients and 258 hospitalizations
per 100,000 inhabitants. If only drug sensitive infections
are imported, and drug resistance develops only de novo,
the number of outpatients increases to 20,700 (106%)
and the number of hospitalizations increases to 312
(121%; Table 1). If resistant infections do not only
develop de novo, but are imported into the population 21
days after onset of the epidemic, the numbers rise to
22,700 (116%) outpatients and to 420 (163%) hospitali-
zations. If the resistant strain is imported before the drug
sensitive one, numbers even rise to 25,100 (129%) outpa-
tients and 601 (233%) hospitalizations, (Table 1). The
latter values do not change if the resistant strain is
imported a second time on day 21.
If a resistant strain emerges only de novo, its prevalence
may remain low, implying little epidemiological conse-
quences (Figure 1a). Importation of resistance, however,
increasingly replaces the drug sensitive strain because the
latter is continuously eliminated by treatment. The domi-
nance of the resistant strain depends on when its impor-
tation starts. E. g. if a drug resistant strain is imported 21
days after seeding the epidemic (with a sensitive strain),
the prevalence curve for the resistant strain mimics in a
delayed shape the prevalence of the sensitive strain (Fig-
Table 1: Expected number of outpatients and hospitalizations in various scenarios with drug resistant infections
1st infection imported on day 0 2nd infection imported on day 21 Total number of outpatients Total number of hospitalizations
sensitive strain sensitive strain 20,700 313
sensitive strain resistant strain 22,700 420
resistant strain sensitive strain 25,100 601
resistant strain resistant strain 25,100 601
All patients who seek medical help ('outpatients') are offered antiviral treatment. The scenario without drug resistant infection leads to 19,500 
outpatients and 258 hospitalizations, respectively. Population size 100,000; parameter values see Figure 1 and text.Virology Journal 2008, 5:133 http://www.virologyj.com/content/5/1/133
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Figure 1 (see legend on next page)
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ure 1b). If the time point for the importation of the resist-
ant strain is shifted towards the initial phase of the
epidemic, the resistant strain increasingly replaces the sen-
sitive strain (Figure 1c). Early importation of resistant
infection increases the number of treatment failures and
thus, increases the overall number of infections emerging
from the epidemic (Figure 1a–c). A sensitivity analysis
which addresses the influence of the non-pharmaceutical
interventions on these results is presented as an additional
file (Additional file 1). Figure 2 illustrates the total num-
bers of (a) outpatients, (b) hospitalizations, and (c)
deaths in dependence of a given time delay between the
importation of the drug sensitive and the drug resistant
infection (0–30 days).
Current mathematical models focus more on de novo drug
resistance than on imported and spreading resistant infec-
tions [5,20,21]. Although de novo development of NI
resistance may occur so late within a treated patient that
the patient is unlikely to pass on the infection, wide-
spread use of treatment makes it highly likely that resist-
ant virus will circulate in the population if its relative fit-
ness is high. We show in our simulations, that the
development of de novo resistance on a low level and the
subsequent spread of resistant virus results in a substan-
tially increased number of hospitalizations, and subse-
quently in more ICU patients and deaths. Especially the
shortcoming in the availability of intensive care beds has
to be considered [22,23]. This situation is aggravated if an
already resistant virus is imported into a population in the
early phase of an epidemic. Up to now, only little atten-
tion has been paid to such scenarios. Observations in the
early phase of the 2007/8 influenza season showed a
marked increase of oseltamivir resistant influenza A virus
(H1N1) in various European countries. The current osel-
tamivir resistant virus does not pose any risk to cause a
pandemic as the H1N1 strain has been circulating in the
population for many years without pandemic potential
and leaving the population at least partially immune. The
implications for avian influenza H5N1 remain uncertain.
Oseltamivir resistance due to the same mutation has been
reported in three patients with H5N1 infection who were
treated with oseltamivir. As H5N1 viruses have not yet
shown the ability to spread efficiently from person to per-
son there seems currently no potential for a similar
increase. However, the appearance of a spreading NI-
resistant seasonal influenza strain is unexpected and of
great concern. It highlights that even in the absence of
widespread NI use for treatment or prophylaxis, oseltami-
vir resistant strains can emerge and spread in the popula-
tion [6]. It also highlights the importance of our
simulations for the elaboration of appropriate control
and prevention strategies. We point out that the early
introduction of a resistant influenza virus with pandemic
potential may easily become an overwhelming public
health problem. An increase of infections of 30% and a
more than doubled total number of hospitalizations dem-
onstrate this challenge. Non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions considered by health decision makers and
occupational medicine specialists in their pandemic pre-
paredness plans may play a crucial role.
List of abbreviations
NI: Neuraminidase inhibitors; R0: basic reproduction
number.
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Prevalence of infection with the drug sensitive virus (solid lines in black), the drug resistant one (dashed lines) and the sum of  both (dotted lines) Figure 1 (see previous page)
Prevalence of infection with the drug sensitive virus (solid lines in black), the drug resistant one (dashed lines) 
and the sum of both (dotted lines). All cases who seek medical help ('outpatients') receive antiviral treatment. The grey 
curves indicate the fractions of resistant infections among all infections. In all 3 graphs, resistance develops de novo in 4.1% of 
children and 0.32% of adults who receive treatment. (a) Drug-sensitive infections are imported on day 0 and 21; (b) Drug sen-
sitive infection is imported on day 0, followed by a drug-resistant one on day 21; (c) Drug resistant infection is imported on day 
0, followed by a drug-sensitive one on day 21. Further assumptions: (1) Swiss population of 100,000 individuals. (2) R0 = 2.5 for 
the drug sensitive and the drug resistant virus. Both strains are assumed to have the same transmissibility. (3) One third of all 
infected individuals become severely sick and seek medical help. Antiviral treatment reduces their contagiousness by 80% and 
their duration of sickness by 25% if they are infected with the drug sensitive virus. (4) General social distancing reduces the 
number of contacts by 10% for all individuals; isolation additionally prevents 10%, 20% and 30% of contacts of moderately sick 
cases, severely sick cases at home, and hospitalized cases, respectively. For references about assumptions and parameter values 
see text.Virology Journal 2008, 5:133 http://www.virologyj.com/content/5/1/133
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The solid curves show the expected total numbers of (a) outpatients, (b) hospitalizations, and (c) deaths, respectively, during a  pandemic wave in a population of 100,000 inhabitants where on day 0 a drug-sensitive infection is imported, followed by a  drug-resistant one after the time delay given on the horizontal axis Figure 2
The solid curves show the expected total numbers of (a) outpatients, (b) hospitalizations, and (c) deaths, 
respectively, during a pandemic wave in a population of 100,000 inhabitants where on day 0 a drug-sensitive 
infection is imported, followed by a drug-resistant one after the time delay given on the horizontal axis. With-
out introduction of a resistant infection, 20,700 outpatients, 314 hospitalizations and 82 deaths are expected (dashed reference 
lines). If resistant infection is neither introduced de novo nor imported, 19,500 outpatients, 258 hospitalizations and 66 deaths 
are expected (dotted reference lines). Parameter values see Figure 1 and text.
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